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Abstract
Background: Hygiene promotion is a cornerstone of humanitarian response during infectious disease outbreaks.
Despite this, we know little about how humanitarian organisations design, deliver or monitor hygiene programmes, or
about what works to change hygiene behaviours in outbreak settings. This study describes humanitarian perspectives
on changing behaviours in crises, through a case study of hygiene promotion during the 2014–2016 Liberian Ebola
outbreak. Our aim was to aid better understanding of decision making in high-stress situations where there is little
precedent or evidence, and to prompt reflection within the sector around how to improve and support this.
Methods: We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with fourteen purposively-sampled individuals (key
informants) from international organisations involved in hygiene behaviour change during the outbreak. Through
thematic analysis we identified the decisions that were made and processes that were followed to design, deliver and
monitor interventions. We compared our findings with theory-driven processes used to design behaviour change
interventions in non-outbreak situations.
Results: Humanitarians predominantly focussed on providing hygiene products (e.g. buckets, soap, gloves) and
delivering messages through posters, radio and community meetings. They faced challenges in defining which
hygiene behaviours to promote. Assessments focused on understanding infrastructural needs, but omitted systematic
assessments of hygiene behaviours or their determinants. Humanitarians assumed that fear and disease awareness
would be the most powerful motivators for behaviour change. They thought that behaviour change techniques used
in non-emergency settings were too ‘experimental’, and were beyond the skillset of most humanitarian actors.
Monitoring focussed on inputs and outputs rather than behavioural impact.
Conclusions: The experiences of humanitarians allowed us to identify areas that could be strengthened when
designing hygiene programmes in future outbreaks. Specifically, we identified a need for rapid research methods to
explore behavioural determinants; increased skills training for frontline staff, and increased operational research to
explore behaviour change strategies that are suited to outbreak situations.
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Background
In recent decades, a number of factors have led to a rise in
the rate of emerging infections with the potential to cause
internationally significant epidemics [1–3]. The outbreak
of Ebola Virus Disease (the Ebola outbreak) in West Af-
rica between 2014 and 2016 is perhaps the most pertinent
recent example of this. Hygiene promotion is a corner-
stone of humanitarian response during outbreaks. How-
ever, at the start of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, there was
limited evidence about what types of hygiene promotion
activities were effective in outbreaks generally [4, 5], and
almost no evidence about the effectiveness of hygiene pro-
motion in Ebola outbreaks. Despite a lack of evidence and
guidance, humanitarians were under pressure to act. This
dilemma is not new - the challenges of making critical
programmatic decisions with imperfect information has
been documented as an area of concern in many humani-
tarian responses [6–8]. Our aim in this study was to aid
better understanding of, and ultimately better support for,
decision making in high-stress situations where there is
little precedent or evidence.
Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Liberia
Ebola virus enters the body through orifices, mucous
membrane or breaks in the skin. The greatest risk is from
direct contact with bodily fluids of a symptomatic or de-
ceased patient, namely blood, vomit, excreta, sweat, saliva,
semen, or breast milk. Direct contact with an infected
person’s skin is believed to be lower risk, and transmission
by contact with the virus on environmental surfaces is rare
[9, 10]. The virus is not transmitted through food or
water, and is not airborne [10].
The 2014 Ebola outbreak was classified as a ‘Public
Health Emergency of International Concern’ because of
its high caseload, mortality rates of nearly 40%, and geo-
graphical spread (World Health Organisation, 2016b).
Previous Ebola outbreaks (in West and Central Africa)
have occurred in rural populations and declined relatively
quickly. By contrast, in September 2014, the number of
new Ebola cases in Liberia was doubling every 10–15 days
[11]. With no cure or vaccine yet available, preventing
transmission was crucial. The altered ‘F Diagram’ in Fig. 1
depicts the known viral transmission routes from an in-
fected (symptomatic) person/animal to a new (in this case,
human) host, based on limited evidence from previous
outbreaks with comparable strains [10, 12], laboratory and
non-human testing, and biologically plausible evidence
from testing on similar viruses [13]. Thicker arrows indi-
cate greater likelihood of transmission through this route.
The vertical boxes -show the ‘barriers’, or interventions
that can be put in place to stop or minimise transmission.
Handwashing with soap is normally considered the main
‘hygiene barrier’ for infection control, but in the context of
Ebola, hygiene interventions can be much more wide-
reaching, including avoidance of skin-to skin contact with
the sick; ‘safe’ burials, cleaning surfaces that could be
Fig. 1 Ebola Virus Disease transmission diagram (author’s diagram, images free to use under creative commons license - CC0 1.0)
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contaminated by infected human fluids (at home or in
health facilities), and properly cooking bush meat.
Before the Ebola outbreak nearly a quarter of Liberia’s
population did not have access to water sources that were
safe from contamination, half practised open defecation
(rising to 68% in rural areas), and only 1% of the total
population had access to a handwashing facility at home
with soap and water [14].
Changing hygiene behaviours
Behaviour change is necessary for most public health in-
terventions. Until quite recently the status quo in public
health interventions has been to educate populations
about the health risks and benefits of different behav-
iours. A growing number of studies now suggest that
there is little association between knowledge of health
benefits and actual performance of a behaviour [15–19],
especially when compared to other factors that deter-
mine behaviour [20, 21].
A contrasting approach to behaviour change program-
ming is to create an intervention that targets key determi-
nants to shift behaviour. This is done after thoroughly
assessing all of the factors that positively or negatively influ-
ence behaviours in a particular context (hereafter we call
these behavioural determinants). Instead of improving
knowledge, this approach might highlight the need to
change social norms, appeal to specific personal motiva-
tions, or introduce behavioural cues into the environment.
Michie et al. [22] identify 93 distinct techniques like these,
which can be used to cause a change in behaviour. Inter-
ventions designed in this way are often called ‘theory-
driven’ since they draw upon a theoretical understanding of
how behaviour is determined and changed. They are usu-
ally accompanied by a testable hypothesis of the precise
mechanisms by which behaviour is expected to change (a
theory of change). Interventions developed through theory-
driven approaches have been able to demonstrate substan-
tial shifts in observed hygiene behaviour in non-outbreak
settings [23–27], but we know little about whether theory-
driven approaches are feasible or effective in emergency
settings, or how similar or different the determinants of be-
haviour change are. For example, communicating health
risks during infectious disease outbreaks may be more ef-
fective than in non-outbreak settings [28, 29], but may only
have short term effects [30]. Using motives like disgust,
shame or nurture (the desire to do what is best for your
child) might be just as relevant in emergencies, but there
may also be additional ethical considerations of using such
motivators with vulnerable communities [31, 32].
Frameworks and processes exist to help programme de-
signers to select the most appropriate behaviour change
approaches for each problem and context. Within the
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector the follow-
ing frameworks provide both definitions of determinants
and a process for programme design: RANAS (Risks, Atti-
tudes, Norms, Abilities, and Self-regulation) [33]; Design-
ing for Behaviour Change [34], and Behaviour Centred
Design [35]. There is increasing interest in designing
theory-driven and evidence-based interventions to im-
prove hygiene promotion in major disease outbreaks or
other emergency settings [30, 32], but so far there has
been little attempt to translate existing approaches. The
exception is the RANAS questionnaire, which has been
used to identify behavioural determinants (retrospectively)
during the 2010 Haitian earthquake, in drought-affected
Ethiopia, and with the aim of preventing an Ebola out-
break in Guinea-Bissau [36–38].
Although the terminology and methods vary, the process
for designing interventions is relatively similar across these
frameworks. Each proposes a five-stage, theory-driven
programme design process. The first stage typically involves
programme designers gathering existing knowledge about
the target behaviours, audience, and context (in this paper
we call this stage ‘assessment’). Deeper insights are then
gathered by carrying out formative research to assess the
behavioural determinants for that context (here called ‘un-
derstanding behaviour’). The third stage involves iteratively
creating and pre-testing the intervention package (here
called ‘programme design’). ‘programme delivery’ and
‘evaluation’ are stages four and five. Utilisation of an inter-
vention design process, like this, is becoming increasingly
commonplace in the development sector.
Aims and objectives for the current study
Our study aimed to understand decision making in
high-stress situations where there is little precedent or
evidence, and ultimately prompt reflection within the
sector around how to improve and support this. Our
study objective was to describe humanitarian perspec-
tives on changing behaviours in crises, through a case
study of hygiene promotion during the Liberian Ebola
outbreak. This study does not attempt to answer the
question of what worked or did not work to change hy-
giene behaviours, but we do report participants’ percep-
tions of successes, constraints, and the feasibility of
alternative approaches.
Methods
Sample selection
We conducted in-depth, semi-structured, key informant
interviews during July and August 2016. Participants
were individuals from international organisations that
implemented, funded or were otherwise involved in in-
terventions to change hygiene behaviours in communi-
ties or in healthcare settings during the Ebola outbreak
in Liberia (2014–16). We included bilateral donors,
implementing partners and technical experts.
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Participants were purposively sampled. We contacted all
organisations from an initial list of 22 organisations identi-
fied through a review of minutes of the WASH Cluster
and Case Management committee meetings of the Na-
tional Ebola Taskforce in Liberia (organisations working
in Liberia typically attended these meetings). Interviews
were requested by email, with three unanswered emails
considered as a refusal. Participants were asked for further
recommendations of organisations and individuals to ap-
proach. Eligible participants had worked on the Ebola re-
sponse for all or part of the time between March 2014 and
the outbreak’s declared end in June 2016 [39]. Eligible or-
ganisations had to be involved in designing or delivering
hygiene interventions in programmes in the community
or in routine health facilities.
Data collection
We prepared a list of interview questions to guide our inter-
views, which could be adapted flexibly during each interview
(see Additional file 1). We asked participants to describe the
interventions they were involved with, and how decisions
were made during the design, delivery, and monitoring of
interventions, i.e. across the five stages of the theory-driven
programme design process described above. We also asked
participants about their perceived program constraints and
successes. All interviews were conducted by the lead re-
searcher (AC) in English, recorded and transcribed.
Data analysis
We analysed data concurrently with collection, using a the-
matic, six-stage approach suggested by Braun and Clarke
[40]. Concurrent analysis of the transcripts helped us to
identify when we had reached a point of saturation. We
coded transcripts inductively using NVivo 11 software, and
themes were grouped under headings based on the five
stages of theory-driven programme design process. In the
discussion, we reflect on the differences between the ap-
proach described to us, and approaches taken in non-
emergency settings, and make recommendations about
how we can more effectively design, deliver and monitor
hygiene programmes during outbreaks and crises, when
compromises have to be made.
Ethics
Participants were provided with an information sheet
explaining the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature
of participation, and our commitment to preserving confi-
dentiality and anonymity of individuals and organisations
in reporting. All participants were adults who gave written
consent after an opportunity to ask any questions they
had. Ethical approval was obtained from the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Ref. 11,349)
and the National Review Ethics Board of Liberia (Ref.
NREB-015.06).
Results
We conducted in-depth interviews with 14 individuals
from 12 international organisations. Nine were from
international non-Governmental organisations (iNGOs)
three from organisations in the United Nations (UN)
system and two from bilateral donor agencies. Three or-
ganisations agreed to interviews but responded too late
for inclusion and six organisations did not respond
(Fig. 2). These organisations were not further pursued
because the authors felt that a degree of saturation had
been reached through the initial 14 interviews.
All participants were at a senior level (Programme Man-
ager or higher) and had between six and 24months’ experi-
ence working on the Ebola response in Liberia. Seven
participants described themselves as Water Hygiene and
Sanitation (WASH) or Infection Prevention and Control
(IPC) specialists, one as a communications specialist, and
six had oversight over several different areas. Twelve inter-
views were conducted by telephone or Skype, one face-to-
face and one participant requested to respond by email. On
average, interviews lasted around 1 h (range 45–90min).
Four participants focused on behaviour change within rou-
tine health facilities (named H1 - H4) and ten in community
settings (C1- C10). All but one participant stated changing
hygiene behaviours as a key organisational priority.
Handwashing was the most commonly mentioned hy-
giene behaviour, but emic definitions of ‘hygiene interven-
tions’ were much wider-ranging than we had anticipated.
Participants often described behaviours such as reducing
general physical contact (e.g. not shaking hands); keeping
a distance from sick or deceased individuals (and their
bodily fluids), and ensuring burials were conducted by
trained burial teams. Wider aspects of infection control,
water provision and sanitation were also described as be-
ing part of hygiene programming. We therefore include
these elements in our analysis. Our results are structured
according to the five stage, theory-driven programme de-
sign process employed in non-emergency settings.
Stage one and two: assessment and understanding
behaviour
The main focus of early assessments carried out in commu-
nities or health facilities was to identify gaps in infrastructure
(e.g. wells, or road access) and to make contact with local
leaders who could facilitate access to communities. None of
the participants reported systematically collecting informa-
tion about current hygiene behaviours. One participant re-
ported that emergency responders did not attempt to learn
from existing hygiene promotion interventions in Liberia.
A whole raft of new emergency staff entered Liberia
and tried to work in an emergency vacuum. They as-
sumed there was no existing data and did little to
try and understand the previous situation […] it
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could have been very useful to look at existing re-
search and materials that had been developed. No
emergency staff from INGO emergency teams or gov-
ernment staff showed any interest in that. [C7].
Several participants explained that it was seen as a low pri-
ority to understand psychological or social determinants of
hygiene behaviour determinants, because it was decided early
on that hardware and infrastructure would take precedence
over behaviour change ‘software’ (e.g. training or messaging):
It’s all very well going in and doing [hygiene] train-
ing but if they haven’t got pit latrines and they
haven’t got a clean water source it’s a bit like Marie
Antoinette and ‘let them eat cake.’ [C2].
I always get frustrated with social and behavioural
sciences […] the idea that people aren’t doing things
because they are not educated or they lack
information […] behaviour change sinks in when the
materials are actually there. [C3].
Many of the hygiene behaviours recommended were not
precisely defined, i.e. in terms of who should perform the
behaviour, when it should be performed, or how. Some
participants felt that this resulted in weak messages:
The handwashing messages were terrible. ‘Wash your
hands all the time’ seemed to be the primary mes-
sage. There was no information about when, or how
to wash hands or who should be doing it. [C7].
The lack of evidence and precedent in the early stage
of the outbreak made it particularly difficult for re-
sponders to be more precise about the behaviours re-
quired to reduce disease transmission. For example, one
major point of contention early on was whether to ad-
vise handwashing with soap or handwashing with a
chlorine solution:
Fig. 2 Description of sampling and participation rates
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We were so worried that we didn’t have any evi-
dence; we didn’t know whether hand washing with
soap or chlorine was better...Technical experts were
going in circles because they didn’t have [academic]
papers to look at, and the ones that were there were
fuzzy. [C4].
Stage three: Programme design
The intervention components
Providing water, buckets with taps, soap/chlorine, gloves
and other protective clothing in communities and health
facilities was reported as the biggest component of the
hygiene interventions. Hygiene messages were delivered
alongside this on posters, billboards, on radio programmes,
and face-to-face, by local Community Health Workers
(CHWs) and local volunteers across the country through-
out the outbreak. The nature, intensity and coverage of this
community engagement varied across the country. This
depended on the effectiveness of existing community health
systems and county-level emergency operations centre, as
well as the strategy of the different international organisa-
tions supporting the government in that area.
The messages evolved over the course of the outbreak,
and broadly aligned with the headline messages chosen by
the government and key media partners. The first headline
message - ‘Ebola Kills’ – ran from March 2014 until
around June. Hygiene messages in this phase aimed to
amplify a feeling of fear and risk of death if you did not
perform the recommended hygiene behaviours. This was
replaced by ‘Ebola is Real’ from approximately July to Oc-
tober 2014, where hygiene messages still focussed on
amplifying perceived risks of transmission but with more
of a focus on understanding the disease without evoking
fear. Finally, the ‘Ebola must Go’ message encouraged the
maintenance of behaviours to protect family and country.
Figure 3 describes the phasing of these messages through-
out the outbreak. The creative process by which the
slogans, images and hygiene messages were chosen and
produced was reportedly driven by the Government of
Liberia with support from a small number of other organi-
sations. Most participants were positive about the cam-
paigns created and the delivery channels used to
disseminate them.
Two training packages were targeted at health workers in
routine health facilities. The ‘Keep Safe, Keep Serving’ train-
ing package was developed in early September 2014 to ad-
dress issues related to triage and isolation, cleaning and
waste management, protective clothing, and handwashing.
From August 2015, the ‘Safe and Quality Services’ training
package replaced this – emphasising that health workers
should understand general infection control and hygiene
principles and be able to apply them to protect themselves
and patients against many diseases. This package also intro-
duced psychosocial training modules. Both were developed
by small working groups of partners.
Decisions and processes affecting how interventions were
designed
Participants described the compromises that were made
to a typical intervention design process due to the nature
of the emergency context:
The typical approach is you scope it, you have your
concept, your expert panel groups, you create it, you
Fig. 3 Timeline of national community campaigns and health worker training packages (author’s diagram, the images are photographs of
billboards developed by the Liberian Ministry of Health and other Non-Government actors)
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pilot it, and then disseminate it. 5 stage approach.
When you think about the Ebola context, the [health
worker training package] was literally made in a couple
of days by three people locked in a room [...] The biggest
difference [in a non-emergency setting] is the time they
have to create this and the loops and hoops they jump
through to make sure it is relevant, acceptable, and en-
dorsed. With the epidemic stuff it was very much ‘who
cares? Roll it out, looks good on paper, go.’ [H1].
It was a true time of crisis and it got out of control
before they knew it and there was not a lot of time
to think about the approach to how to get people to
do the right behaviour. It became ‘this is what you
have to do’; it was not ‘how do we do this together to
get the right outcome’. […] Right or wrong, that’s just
what happened. [H3].
These compromises reportedly led to some issues with
implementation. For example, the messages delivered on
posters and by health workers aimed to improve biomed-
ical knowledge and understanding of transmission path-
ways, based on an assumption that people would modify
their behaviour once they knew what was ‘best’ for them.
In an emergency, information is probably the most
important thing you can give people because then
you can make a well-informed decision […] people
will generally act in their own best interest. [C9].
However, some participants reported that this medica-
lised view of disease was at odds with the way many
communities conceptualised health and the body:
In some of the extremely remote settings, those mes-
sages of ‘Ebola is Real’ might not have even been
internalised and understood because of really strong
traditional beliefs in other spiritual things. [C3].
[Liberian people] have a huge element of understanding
a disease to be spiritual. You have to come in with
some kind of understanding. [...] You can’t go in with a
biological teaching because they have no basic concept
of biology. [C2].
All emergency responders were expected to use the
same, approved hygiene messages in their promotional
materials. These were decided by the Government of
Liberia with selected international partners who would
instruct other organisations at a weekly ‘messaging and
media’ working group. Most participants agreed it was
important that key national messages changed simultan-
eously across the country.
We don’t want everybody doing something different
because that will just breed confusion. [C4].
We had to change at the same time […] The old
messages and jingles had to be removed so we are
all on the same planet, same page. [C8].
Others reflected that the decision to take a standar-
dised approach had hampered the effectiveness of the
messaging in some areas where it was not reflective of
the local situation and needs:
I don’t think the messages, as they were, were really
that effective. Different pockets of the population had
different exposure to Ebola. In Lofa [county] you
could say ‘Ebola is real, don’t touch dead bodies’,
right, yeah. I’ve seen that happen. But there are vil-
lages down in Rivercess [county] that have never had
any cases. [C9].
When it came to deciding on emotional or psychological
elements of hygiene messaging, the fear of contracting
Ebola was assumed to be the most powerful motivator of
behaviour change:
Fear played a very big role. Everyone was afraid; if I
don’t do it [handwashing] I’m going to die. [C1].
As people and communities came round to the under-
standing that Ebola was real … and they saw people
getting sick then they did start to change their practices.
So I think there was a level of fear that drove that. [C2].
However, participants noted that motivation via fear
sometimes produced behaviour change that was unex-
pected, unproductive or even dangerous:
At first the message was ‘Ebola Kills’ so everybody was
… waking up saying ‘oh my god - there is no alterna-
tive so why are you telling me even to wash my hands?’
So we had to change after listening to the communities
and realising that they had understood the message
but the fear feeling was not going to work because it
was not supporting the follow up actions. [C8].
Because of the fear, people were putting a lot in the
water – Dettol, chlorine, soap because they knew this
would stop the virus. The outcome was people get-
ting their hands irritated and that was going to
cause more problems. [C8].
Messages rarely went beyond increasing perception of
risk and the motivation of fear. In retrospect, some par-
ticipants reported this as a missed opportunity,
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suggesting that factors such as peer pressure or shame
may have also been important:
I think there was a huge missed opportunity to use
other determinants and messages, considering that
we know fear only works when there is a threat of
the public health issue. [C7].
‘I think the best way to reach [health workers] is by
speaking a language they’re going to understand and
connecting a message that actually tugs at their
heartstrings. Otherwise I don’t see why anyone would
be motivated to do anything differently. [H7].
I think there’s strong human behaviour of peer pres-
sure and if you see everybody else doing it then you’re
going to be like, ok well I should do this too. [C3].
However, two organisations were reluctant to use
negatively framed motivators like shame:
The public shaming piece is not something we would
ever want to condone; however, we have seen that
there is a lot of evidence that it is successful in many
settings including here in Liberia. We would usually
take more of a compassionate approach. [C3].
When asked about the processes used to design the
behaviour change components of hygiene programs, par-
ticipants answered with less fluency (and more pauses)
than in other parts of the interviews. Behaviour change
as was generally perceived as a specialised skill:
I by no means claim to be an expert on any of this. [H3].
I’m not a specialist in this area. [C9].
I don’t know in terms of individual behaviour change
theories. We do have a cadre of workers who are be-
haviour scientists. […] but I’m just not engaged
enough. [H1].
Employing alternative behaviour change techniques
(other than improving knowledge and increasing percep-
tion of risk) was considered to be too ‘experimental’ by
some respondents:
It was all about saving lives. There wasn’t much
time to do a lot of experiments. [C1].
Stage 4: Programme delivery: humanitarian perspectives
about what worked and was acceptable
Participants felt strongly that the way interventions were de-
livered was the key to their success in changing behaviours.
For example, there was a belief that hygiene messages would
be more effective if the ‘right’ people delivered the messages
and interventions. They avoided deploying ‘outsiders’ for
this task, who would not have the communities’ trust, and
instead used locally known and trusted messengers:
One thing that was critical was having Liberian
healthcare workers talking to Liberian healthcare
workers, and they said ‘look, we went through the
same thing you’re going through, you almost died, we
almost died, if we all just do this together and do
what we’re supposed to do, we won’t get Ebola.’ [H4].
We had about 450 staff and they were local staff. It
was them that did all the training so that it was cul-
turally appropriate, language appropriate and the
community was receptive to it. [C7].
Senior leaders from local and central government, and re-
ligious institutions, were also seen as very important agents
to create change. Some participants attributed this to the
strong culture of ‘top-down’ authority systems in Liberia.
We worked through community leaders, religious
leaders, and traditional leaders because the community
tends to listen more to its community leaders. [C6].
If the chiefs are saying ‘you need to do this’ it’s more
likely that people will do it. If the chiefs and MOH
were saying the same thing that was the double
whammy. [C9].
Several participants said that an approach of engaging
audiences in a ‘dialogue’, or two-way conversation, about
hygiene behaviours was important for creating behaviour
change because this increased acceptability and helped
humanitarian actors to adjust messaging to local
circumstances:
The whole idea was not to go in with a pre-
established mechanism or approach. It was more to
listen to the community, try to pick out the things that
they’re most concerned with … this is probably the
best way to do it. [C4].
Lots of alterations were made along the way as the
[NGO] staff interacted in the communities, with re-
actions to the messages. Adjustments were made in
the language, adjustments were made in the ap-
proach and so on. [C10].
Stage 5: evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation were primarily designed to
identify regions of particular concern – for example
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communities where there was resistance and denial, or
health facilities with very poor capacity for infection
control.
Organisations monitored inputs and activities rather than
outcomes or impact. In communities and health facilities
indicators were collected on provision (e.g. numbers of
buckets distributed) and reach (e.g. estimations of those at-
tending awareness events). Other data was anecdotal, e.g.
through observing training sessions or collecting ad-hoc
feedback from communities. None of the organisations
interviewed systematically monitored outcomes related to
hygiene knowledge, awareness, or behaviour.
We generally have some basic M&E from the begin-
ning in terms of how much we have distributed be-
cause that’s easy to record, number of buckets. We
were able to estimate the number of people we
reached with Ebola messaging, how well that worked
I have no idea. [C2].
[We were] not watching healthcare workers for X
number of hours interact with people […] I think
that’s a big weakness, it turns into an anecdotal situ-
ation, which is very common in the response
throughout. [H1].
In Table 1 we summarise our key findings to the
theory-based model of hygiene programme design.
Discussion
The Ebola outbreak of 2014–16 was unique in its scale
and complexity. There was no ‘roadmap’ for the design
of hygiene behaviour change interventions in such a
context. However, the decisions made during this out-
break have informed the humanitarian response to the
subsequent 2018/19 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and have had wide-reaching im-
pacts on global public health landscape [41]. As with any
emergency of this significance there has also been sub-
stantial criticism of decision making during the outbreak
and identification of areas where learning could have
been enhanced [42, 43].
We did not set out to criticise the interventions cre-
ated, but to understand how hygiene promotion inter-
ventions were designed, delivered and monitored by
humanitarian response organisations in a difficult situ-
ation with limited evidence or precedent. This was done
with the aim of prompting greater reflection within the
emergency response sector about how hygiene pro-
grammes can be designed and delivered more effectively,
and meet the challenges of future disease outbreaks with
improved tools and approaches.
Table 1 Description of the 5 theory-based steps used in standard programme design compared to our findings of what was done
during the Liberian Ebola outbreak
Theory-based steps for designing a
hygiene behaviour change programme
Process of designing hygiene behaviour change
programmes in Liberia during the Ebola outbreak.
Assessment - programme designers gathering existing knowledge
about the target behaviours, audience, and context
Existing research and resources on hygiene behaviour were not utilised.
In the absence of clear evidence humanitarians struggled to define
key hygiene behaviours.
Understanding behaviour – formative research is undertaken to
develop a deeper understanding of behaviour at the current time
Assessments focused on the availability of infrastructure rather than
behavioural barriers or determinants.
Programme design - iteratively creating and pre-testing the
intervention package with your target audience.
The design process was rushed with actors feeling the need to act.
Programmes primarily focused on providing hygiene products and
teaching people about Ebola transmission and preventative behaviours.
Hygiene messages were standardised across the country. This was
viewed as minimising risk and confusion but it also meant that
messaging was often not contextualised to different experiences
within the country.
Opportunities may have been missed to utilise alternative behaviour
change techniques, particularly emotional or psychological determinants
of behaviour.
Programme delivery – training and supporting staff as
they delivering activities as intended.
Programmes were seen as more successful when they used ‘trusted
messengers’ and created a dialogue with community members.
Evaluation – process and impact evaluation of the project. Monitoring primarily focused on identifying regions where there was
community denial or health facilities infection control.
Organisations monitored inputs and activities rather than outcomes
or impact.
There was no systematic monitoring of hygiene knowledge, awareness,
or behaviour
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By coding the results under the five stages of ‘theory-
driven’ programme design, we identified differences
between the processes used during this Ebola outbreak and
the methods developed for designing, implementing and
evaluating behaviour change interventions in non-outbreak
settings. Vujcic et.al [44]. documented humanitarian per-
spectives on the design of hygiene programs for displaced
and refugee populations. Among other things they identi-
fied challenges in the contextualisation of programming,
limited local capacity on behaviour change and poor moni-
toring of hygiene behaviour change programs. We also
identified significant barriers to implementing theory-
driven behaviour change interventions in outbreaks. Three
barriers in particular are discussed here, each highlighting
the need for sector wide reflection and discussion:
Limited attention to behavioural determinants
Criticism of the international response to the Ebola out-
break frequently focused on the failure to engage commu-
nities early on, and poor alignment to local context and
culture [45–47]. We found that participants had given this
a lot of thought in the delivery phase, but not in the design
phase. There was no systematic attempt to collate existing
knowledge on behavioural determinants or build on this
knowledge through further research. Consequently, the
interventions that emerged focused relatively narrowly on
the provision of ‘hardware’, improving knowledge, and in-
creasing fear. These interventions might have been effect-
ive at reducing transmission [48]. Evidence from stable
settings certainly supports the initial choice among many
humanitarian organisations to prioritise infrastructure
[49–52]. Provision of handwashing infrastructure has also
proved effective in protracted crises and cholera out-
breaks, but in these contexts was strengthened by a ‘soft’
behaviour change-focused intervention [53, 54].
Interventions emphasising the biomedical risk and
amplifying fear appeared to be poorly accepted by some
communities - in certain cases leading to harm e.g. skin
irritation caused by excessive use of chlorine. The au-
thors of the RANAS theory of behaviour argue that it is
common for health promotion messages in emergency
settings to focus on increasing the ‘perceived susceptibil-
ity and perceived severity of contracting a disease, and
factual knowledge about the possibility of being affected’
[33] p.561, forgetting other behavioural factors that are
also important predictors of behaviour. Other studies
have even shown that behaviour can change during dis-
ease outbreaks without people feeling any increased
sense of infection risk [55].
Some participants felt there had been a missed opportun-
ity to explore a wider range of social determinants of be-
haviour, particularly social pressure and social norms.
Reviewing posters and radio messages from the outbreak
suggests that these determinants were already being
targeted to some extent (for example: ‘Ebola must Go. Stop-
ping the spread of Ebola is everybody’s business’) [56], but
that they could have been utilised more effectively.
Formative research tools to help responders to identify
a wider range of behavioural determinants could be de-
veloped for emergency settings. Participants in this study
felt that behaviour change was beyond their remit and
skills, suggesting that new tools should be accessible to
non-specialised practitioners. Vujcic, Ram [32] identified
a similar knowledge gap in humanitarian emergencies
and recommended training in behaviour change theory
for staff at every level.
There was huge international pressure to respond rap-
idly at the start of the Ebola outbreak, which prevented
the often lengthy process of collecting and analysing for-
mative research data. New formative research tools must
also be able to generate results quickly, and must be use-
able at any stage of an outbreak, for example to allow
emergency responders to adjust their programmes based
on the findings once the initial emergency infrastructure
is in place in the acute phase of an outbreak.
Participants expressed wariness to ‘experiment’ with
new types of interventions, or use motivators like shame
or disgust to encourage behaviour change, both of which
have proven useful for behaviour change in non-
emergency contexts [57–60]. DuBois et.al [45]. argue that
responders to the Ebola outbreak were disincentivised to
test novel behaviour change interventions because ‘ra-
tional’ education and information campaigns are easier for
donors and the international press to understand [45]. A
possible way to incentivise or create demand for new in-
terventions is to change perceptions around ‘experiment-
ing’ e.g. using methods that have already gained traction
such as ‘social learning’ methods [61], or approaches that
involve working more closely with communities [62–64].
Small scale pilots of different approaches are needed to
generate more evidence of what works in emergencies and
outbreaks. Such initiatives should involve donors and
practitioners who can translate experiments into scalable
interventions if successful.
Limited questioning of assumptions
We identified assumptions about the design and delivery
of behaviour change interventions in this emergency set-
ting, which are not based on evidence and could benefit
from further research. For example, most participants be-
lieved firmly that nationwide uniformity of key messages
(on posters and radio) was important to avoid confusion
and encourage behaviour change. Similar findings have
been reported in other emergency settings [44]. We sug-
gest that the real reasons might be related to a desire to
demonstrate strong leadership in a time of crises, and that
more research is needed into uniform versus tailored
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messaging before this becomes accepted as standard prac-
tice in future outbreak emergencies.
A second example is the assumption about local cap-
acity. Participants indicated a preference for messages or
other interventions to be delivered by local staff who had
a deeper knowledge of the local context. However, being
local does not necessarily mean you have the natural abil-
ity to promote behaviour change effectively, or to make
the best decisions about how to tailor interventions on the
ground. We suggest that interventions that rely on inter-
personal communication need to build in measures to
train staff at all levels, and to monitor, document and
share field-based changes to improve practice.
Difficulty of monitoring and evaluation
Participants described the monitoring of inputs (e.g.
numbers of buckets purchased) or outputs (e.g. meeting
attendance or communities visited). However, most re-
spondents felt unable to assess the impact of their
programme on behaviour. We were unable to identify
other literature documenting the impact of Ebola hy-
giene programming on behavioural outcomes, but there
is some evidence from other studies that hygiene promo-
tion efforts were successful in increasing knowledge
about Ebola symptoms, transmission and ideal hygiene
practice [65–67]. However, we know that knowledge is
rarely sufficient to change hygiene behaviour [57, 68,
69], and these studies document that hygiene programs
were less effective in changing deep seated beliefs or sus-
taining change over the full course of the outbreak [70].
It is difficult to get valid and reliable health or behav-
iour change outcomes in emergency settings [5]. How-
ever, a first step would be to align emergency response
work with standardised indicators used in the develop-
ment sector e.g. the Joint Monitoring Programmes’
handwashing proxy indicator [71]. Programs could also
include other impact measures, such as behavioural ob-
servations, at a small scale. This would help build a
stronger picture of intervention effectiveness and the
mechanisms of change.
Limitations and reflexivity
Interviews were conducted with a small number of mid-
and senior-level staff from international organisations.
Results therefore omit important local voices from gov-
ernment, or staff more heavily involved in day-to-day
engagement with communities. Approval to interview
representatives of the Liberian government or local
NGOs was granted too late, and therefore these import-
ant voices were omitted from this research. The opin-
ions of Liberians in relation to both the outbreak and
the mode of international response have been reported
elsewhere [61].
Most participants were willing to discuss their ap-
proaches to behaviour change openly during the inter-
view, but some seemed less comfortable to express
personal views that deviated from the ‘official’ position
of their organisation. Most interviews were conducted
by Skype call, but the one participant who answered via
email will have had more time to reflect on the ques-
tions. Responses may be biased due to recall, or shaped
by the large amount of analysis, commentary and criti-
cism the subject had already received.
The lead researcher had existing professional relation-
ships with 10 of the 14 participants, and this ‘insider’
status will have affected the collection, analysis and in-
terpretation of the data.
Conclusions
This study describes humanitarian perspectives on chan-
ging behaviours in crises, through a case study of hy-
giene promotion during the Liberian Ebola outbreak.
We documented how hygiene promotion interventions
were designed, delivered and monitored by humanitarian
response organisations during the Ebola outbreak in
Liberia. We aimed to prompt greater reflection within
the emergency response sector about how hygiene pro-
grams can be designed and delivered more effectively
during major outbreaks. We identified several important
practice and knowledge gaps, including the need for
rapid research methods to explore behavioural determi-
nants, and increased skills training for frontline staff. We
highlighted a number of unchallenged assumptions
which act as barriers to exploring alternative behaviour
change strategies. Sector-wide reflection and discussion
is needed to examine the assumptions and choices that
are made by emergency responders, along with increased
operational research to ensure we have the right tools
and approaches to meet the growing challenges of emer-
ging disease outbreaks.
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